Previously, I have written about the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) and it's Review Panel on which I serve. See NM
Medical Review Commission - Overview and NM
Medical Review Commission - Stats. Because I do serve on the Review Panel, med-mal cases are always of interest to me, obviously. However, one recent decision also teaches important lessons on statutory construction generally, which is quite relevant to an arbitration practice like mine. Specifically, Baker v. Hedstrom M.D., et al., 2012-NMCA-073 (cert granted), teaches us to "exercise caution" in applying the "beguilingly" simplistic "plain meaning rule."
Baker dealt with several consolidated cases in which plaintiffs had asserted med-mal claims against business entities that were not doctors, hospitals or outpatient health care facilities. As such, plaintiffs argued they were not "health care provider[s] as defined under the MMA, even though the business entities had procured insurance coverage under the MMA, were properly licensed, and "the Superintendent of Insurance had listed them all and treated them as qualified health care providers." Id. ¶ 3.
Section 41-5-3(A) of the MMA defines "health care provider" as "a person, corporation, organization, facility[,] or institution licensed or certified by this state to provide health care or professional services as a doctor of medicine, hospital, outpatient health care facility, doctor of osteopathy, chiropractor, podiatrist, nurse anesthetist[,] or physician's assistant[.]"
No party argued that this language was ambiguous. Plaintiffs stressed grammar and urged that the definition only encompasses the enumerated six individuals and two types of business entities. Defendants did "not offer[] a compelling alternative reading of the plain meaning." Instead, they emphasized "the fact that the words 'corporation[s]' and 'organization[s]' appear in the definition of 'health care provider' and claim[ed] that everyone who addressed Section 41-5-3(A) read it as allowing business entities to qualify."
For its part, the Court noted that "[w]ere we to look only at the literal language in Section 41-5-3(A) and nothing else, we would agree with Plaintiffs' interpretation of the term 'health care provider' and further that Defendants do no fall within the definition of that term." However, the Court went on to say that "[w]e must exercise caution in applying the plain meaning rule. 'It's beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous in its face, may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute's meaning.'" Id.,para. 17, citing State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 NM 346, 353 (1994).
Concluding that in this case a literal reading "would conflict with the overall legislative purpose underlying the MA," to wit: to meet a perceived crisis in escalating malpractice insurance costs, and "to promote the health and welfare of the people of New Mexico by making available professional liability insurance for health care providers in New Mexico. See Section 1-5-2. The Court also noted that for thirty years the Superintendent of Insurance had permitted doctor owned corporations or organizations to obtain insurance and become qualified health care providers. Moreover, during that time, "there was no action by the Legislature indicating taht this interpretation of the statute was incorrect."
For these reasons, the Court declined to read the definition of "health care provider" literally, and instead looked to Legislative intent and the interested parties' past practice. The lesson to courts and arbitrators, I think, is not to be too quickly and easily beguiled by supposedly "unambiguous" language. Instead, you must look to the larger context of how that language has or will be applied, to determine if there is an ambiguity or inconsistency after all.
For its part, the Court noted that "[w]ere we to look only at the literal language in Section 41-5-3(A) and nothing else, we would agree with Plaintiffs' interpretation of the term 'health care provider' and further that Defendants do no fall within the definition of that term." However, the Court went on to say that "[w]e must exercise caution in applying the plain meaning rule. 'It's beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous in its face, may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute's meaning.'" Id.,para. 17, citing State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 NM 346, 353 (1994).
Concluding that in this case a literal reading "would conflict with the overall legislative purpose underlying the MA," to wit: to meet a perceived crisis in escalating malpractice insurance costs, and "to promote the health and welfare of the people of New Mexico by making available professional liability insurance for health care providers in New Mexico. See Section 1-5-2. The Court also noted that for thirty years the Superintendent of Insurance had permitted doctor owned corporations or organizations to obtain insurance and become qualified health care providers. Moreover, during that time, "there was no action by the Legislature indicating taht this interpretation of the statute was incorrect."
For these reasons, the Court declined to read the definition of "health care provider" literally, and instead looked to Legislative intent and the interested parties' past practice. The lesson to courts and arbitrators, I think, is not to be too quickly and easily beguiled by supposedly "unambiguous" language. Instead, you must look to the larger context of how that language has or will be applied, to determine if there is an ambiguity or inconsistency after all.
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